2025-03-05

On Wednesday, January 29, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of the Islamist group Tahrir al-Sham, appeared for the first time as the transitional president in the Syrian Parliament following his rise to power on December 8. Dressed in military attire, he addressed a gathering dominated by Islamist armed groups, calling it the “Congress to Declare the Victory of the Syrian Revolution.” SANA, Syria’s official news agency, quoted the spokesperson for the so-called “Military Operations Administration” as saying that the decision to appoint Ahmed al-Sharaa as president and several other key decisions were made during a meeting of Syrian armed group commanders.

A look at the list of groups within the “Military Operations Administration” that attended Wednesday’s meeting and previously made key decisions about Syria’s future reveals that, contrary to the claims of Ahmed al-Sharaa and other officials of the new Syrian government, this governing body is composed solely of a specific ideological faction—18 Islamist armed groups. These include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham / Rada’ al-Adwan, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Izza, Jaysh al-Nasr, Ansar al-Tawhid, Faylaq al-Sham, Jaysh al-Ahrar, Jaysh al-Islam, Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki, Jabhat al-Sham, and other Islamist terrorist groups that have repeatedly taken up arms against each other over factional interests.

These reactionary groups have bypassed the workers and the oppressed masses of Syria, making critical decisions about the country’s future. The so-called “Military Operations Administration,” whose origins and legitimacy remain unclear to the Syrian people, has appointed Ahmed al-Sharaa as the interim president, granting him extensive powers to form a government. He has the authority to appoint members to a temporary legislative council, form a committee to organise a so-called national dialogue conference—supposedly bringing together representatives from all groups and social sectors to create an inclusive government—and represent Syria in regional and international forums, among other duties.

Among the key decisions made by the “Military Operations Administration” is a three-year timeframe for drafting a new constitution and four years for holding nationwide elections. This means the transitional government, initially set to last until March, has been extended to four years. Furthermore, the council has decided to dissolve the Syrian parliament, disband the army and all security and paramilitary forces, suspend the current constitution, abolish the Ba’ath Party along with all National Front-affiliated political and civil institutions, and declare December 8 as Syria’s National Day.

Ahmed al-Sharaa’s claim of establishing an inclusive government stands in stark contrast to the reality that even for this military commanders’ meeting, no invitation was extended to representatives of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—the largest and most powerful military force in Syria, controlling nearly one-third of the country. Furthermore, in his speech, al-Sharaa underscored Syria’s unity and territorial integrity, subtly framing the SDF as separatists. Despite these claims, Ahmed al-Sharaa and other officials of the new government repeatedly assert that Syria’s future administration will be inclusive of all ethnic, religious, and gender groups. However, al-Sharaa justifies appointing officials solely from one faction by arguing that Syria is in a critical phase. He maintains that he is against power-sharing or quota-based governance (“muhasasa”).

However, internal reports indicate that Ahmed al-Sharaa and his defence minister have had to negotiate daily with other Islamist groups’ leaders to allocate key positions and responsibilities in the interim government over the past two months. Despite this, all key positions in his so-called interim government have been filled with members of Tahrir al-Sham, from Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir to Foreign Minister Asaad al-Sheibani and Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasrah. Yet, to legitimise his rule and strengthen his grip on power, Ahmed al-Sharaa claims that Syria’s future government will include all national, religious, and gender groups.

Despite his efforts to solidify power, Ahmed al-Sharaa faces significant internal and external challenges as growing public unrest threatens to destabilise his rule. Regional powers are actively positioning themselves in Syria’s evolving landscape. The Islamic Republic is seeking a way back to restore its lost influence, while Turkey, viewing itself as the primary beneficiary of Syria’s upheaval, is leveraging the situation to further its expansionist and nationalist agenda. At the same time, Arab, European, and Russian leaders are lining up to meet with Ahmed al-Sharaa, each pursuing their strategic objectives.

Without a doubt, Tahrir al-Sham’s Islamist government will be unable to address the economic, political, and social demands of Syrian workers and the struggling masses, who have endured over 50 years of dictatorship under the Assad family, marked by poverty, hunger, war, and displacement. They refuse to be subjected to another Islamic dictatorship. Over the past four decades, Islamist groups—whether in power or opposition—have repeatedly exposed the oppressive and anti-democratic nature of their rule. Their true nature is already well understood, especially by the people of the Middle East. The so-called Islamic Government of Sham, which is already facing widespread resistance and protests in Syria, will be incapable of addressing the needs of the country’s workers and impoverished citizens—90% of whom live below the poverty line.

In these circumstances, if workers, leftist and communist forces, progressives, intellectuals, and revolutionary youth do not quickly organise and assert themselves as a social force, bourgeois factions—Islamic and non-Islamic—will seize the opportunity. Through backroom deals with Western powers and regional governments, they will impose their agendas, marginalise the people, and solidify their grip on power. The power transition in Syria, carried out over the heads of the people, offers a crucial lesson for activists and leaders of the labour movement and other progressive social movements in Iran. Without organising their ranks, forming a unified leadership, and articulating a clear vision for their path forward—including the revolutionary overthrow of the Islamic Republic and the system they seek to establish—they risk missing opportunities, failing to capitalise on emerging ones, and allowing political power to be once again transferred without the involvement of workers and the oppressed masses in Iran’s future transformations.

The Television of the Communist Party of Iran and Komala